How Can Families be Imagined Beyond Kinship and Marriage?
2.3 Marriage, 2.4 Family, 2.5 Kinship,(though this article is an sociological
perspective) students can read, and relate if contemporary social institutions are
asked in Anthropology.
The Transgender
Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019 and the Surrogacy
Regulation Bill, 2019 reinforce the idea of family as a patriarchal,
heterosexual and casteist institution and fail to account for other models
of "chosen families'"and intimacies that co-exist in
India. Given that the Supreme Court has recognised the right to
intimacy as a core component of autonomy and privacy, the article makes a case
for the law to fundamentally rethink the way it regulates personal
relationships and in doing so, adopt a more
functional" approach.
On 5 August 2019, the Lok Sabha passed the Transgender Persons
(Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019 (hereinafter the transgender bill, 2019) and
the Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill, 2019 (hereinafter the surrogacy bill, 2019)
without due deliberations. These bills which reinforce patriarchal,
heteronormative, and casteist values of the "great Indian
family," if passed by the Rajya Sabha, could soon become a reality.
In this piece, the authors critique the predominant
understanding of the family inscribed in these bills as one based solely on
marriage, blood, or adoption. The bills do not acknowledge other
forms of chosen families and intimacies that coexist in the Indian society.
Through an analysis of various existing judicial precedents and recently enacted
laws, the authors argue that the legislature needs to rethink how the said laws
regulate interpersonal relationships.
Prevalence of
Non-normative Families and Families of Choice
The idea of the marital and procreative family is at the heart
of regulation of intimacy by the state. Yet, there are many individuals and
relationships that do not fit into this idea. Recent reports show that single
person households constitute 12.5% of the all households in India (Pandit
2019). Moreover, 7.5% of all the households are lone-parent families of which
majority (4.5% or approximately 13 million households) are headed by women
(Pandit 2019). However, a lesser researched question is how such individuals
live and define family outside of the traditional structures of marriage and
blood ties.
While research in this area is scarce, the greater
visibilisation of the LGBT+ community since the 1980s and 1990s in India threw
light on how some individuals were creating their own structures of support
outside the rigid bounds of marriage. This period saw same-sex couples document
their intention to live together in the form of a registered life partnership
deed (Vanita 2005:97) and in some cases, in the form of friendship contracts
such as Maitri Karar,[1] which declared their status and rights
as a couple (Vanita 2005:63). By 1999, legal alternatives to the idea of the family were explored:
domestic partnerships for the recognition of same-sex relationships were
debated in the Indian context (Fernandez 1999: 73–74) as much as the idea of
how “marriage” could be reformed to recognise queer relationships (Fernandez
1999:83–88).
Further, within the LGBT+ movement, the existence of Hijra
communities also draws attention to the diversity of familial structures
prevalent within the Indian society (Reddy 2005:150; Revathi and Murali
2016:10–13). Hijras, who are cast out of their natal families for defying
strictly enforced gender codes, complicate our understanding of family as they
create their own non-biological forms of kinship. Their households are headed
by older Hijras, known as “gurus” or mothers who take on the economic and social
responsibilities for their “chelas” or children and are responsible for
initiating the chelas into the customs and traditions of the Hijra household.
These relationships are integral to the lineage and descent within Hijra gharanas (Reddy 2005: 150).
Recent academic work on motherhood also explores the concept of
non-normative families. Nandy (2017) explores the stories of women who
identify as “queer” or “lesbian”, unwed biological mothers and unmarried
friends raising an adopted child together. The narratives of these women
highlight the socio-legal exclusions that are faced by those who choose to live
in such arrangements. For instance, what would be the status of an unmarried
woman who has a child with a married man but does not “live-in” with him or
that of two or more friends raising a child together? These narratives
highlight the need for broadening legal recognition of dependency under the
law, especially where it arises out of bonds that are not conjugal or romantic,
but could nonetheless involve significant instances of emotional and economic
interdependence (Nandy 2017: 290–324). As Nandy notes, “Friends are often seen
as ‘outsiders’ to the family because they share neither blood nor material
assets; hence they remain outside the structures created by bloodlines” (2017:
349-350).
Such realities underscore how the social understanding of
"family" is witnessing an intermittent and patchy transition
even while the idea of the marital, procreative, heterosexual family continues
to dominate both the public discourse and our social imagination. In the
following section, we discuss how, despite the diversity of families that exist
in our society, the state continues to reinforce the idea of the marital,
procreative and casteist family through the transgender bill and surrogacy
bill.
Transgender Persons
Bill, 2019: A Step Closer Towards Denying the Right to
Chosen Families
In 2014, the Supreme Court of India in the National Legal
Services Authority (NALSA) v Union of India (2014) (hereinafter the NALSA judgment) case laid the
groundwork for the realisation of the rights of transgender persons within the
framework of the constitutional rights to equality (Article 14), life and
personal liberty (Article 21) and freedom of speech and expression (Article
19). With the intention of giving a legislative framework to the NALSA judgment, a private member’s bill was introduced
by Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Member of Parliament Tiruchi Siva in
2014. This was drawn up in consultation with the transgender
community (Choudhary and Sharma 2018). However, in complete disregard of this
bill, a series of bills from the government followed in 2016 and 2018, which in
the words of the members of the community “were but a death knell on the
culmination of hopes of the community” (Mudraboyina et al 2019). The
Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2019, the latest in the
series, continues down this very path. It was already passed in Lok Sabha and
awaiting discussion and passage in the Rajya Sabha.
The aggrieved community feels that the bill being tabled in the
Parliament smacks of “apathy, neglect and secrecy” towards the transgender
persons in the country (Mudraboyina et al 2019). The bill has problematic
provisions such as the lack of self-determination, lesser punishments in
cases of violence against transgender persons, lack of reservations (Sampoorna
Working Group 2019) and the conflation of the transgender identity with that of
persons with intersex variations[2]. The 2019 bill is in
contravention of the directions given by the Supreme Court in the NALSA judgment [paragraph 129(5)] as it makes it
mandatory for the persons concerned to undergo sex-reassignment surgery in order
to identify within the male-female binary. The bill also restricts the right to
a legal remedy when the state officials act in “good faith” in pursuance of the
provisions of the act (section 21).
Of all the issues mentioned in the bill, fierce criticism has
been levelled against section 2 (c), which expressly defines family as one that
is determined by blood, marriage, or adoption. Under section 12 (3), the bill
empowers the court to pass orders directing a transgender person to be shifted
to a “rehabilitation” centre, thus forcing them to either choose between natal
families (that are usually spaces of violence) or rehabilitation homes. This
reflects the paternalism of the state wherein it denies transgender persons the
autonomy to decide their futures when they face rejection from their natal
families.
This paternalism is further compounded by the failure of the
bill to recognise Hijra households. Some members of the community have
considered the bill to be an “attack on Hijra households,” which have been the
only protective space for trans, intersex and gender non-binary
people abandoned or disowned by their natal families (Sampoorna Working
Group 2019). Others claim that the bill, which does not recognise Hijra
households, is adopted without any application of mind (Mudraboyina et al
2019) and is an attempt to “erase the Hijra culture” (Sinha 2019). The
invisibilisation of such families of choice is one of the chief failings of the
bill.
Surrogacy (Regulation)
Bill, 2019: An Exclusivist and Casteist Law in the Making
In comparison with the transgender bill, the discussion around
the surrogacy bill, 2019 has been limited. An earlier attempt was made to
regulate surrogacy in 2016 when the union cabinet approved the Surrogacy
(Regulation) Bill. Despite the fact that the 2016 bill was critiqued by the
Rajya Sabha Standing Committee (Rajya Sabha 2017), the surrogacy bill, 2019
continues to reproduce the same provisions as those contained in the 2016 bill.
The 2019 bill, like its 2016 predecessor, bans commercial
surrogacy and uncritically adopts the idea of altruistic surrogacy, which has
been extensively criticised by lawyers, activists, and women’s health groups.
The bill defines altruistic surrogacy as one where “no charges, expenses, fees,
remuneration or monetary incentive of whatever nature” [Section 2(b)] can be
paid to the surrogate mother. While the rationale behind this is to prevent
exploitation of women from poor economic classes—which is a possibility in
commercial surrogacy—activists claim that the bill, rather than addressing the
exploitation, attacks the work itself (Gopinathan 2018).
Activist Chayanika Shah critiqued altruistic surrogacy as it
portrays “child bearing as a noble cause that women should do not only for
their husbands, but also for all eligible close relatives chosen and screened
by the state” (Gopinathan 2018). The altruistic view, thus, discounts the
premise that surrogacy is a form of reproductive labour for which a person
should get paid. Even the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee had argued in favour
of “compensated surrogacy” and considered the ban on commercial
surrogacy affecting the right to livelihood of women who wish to become
surrogates (Rajya Sabha 2017: para 5.19).
Additionally, the bill imposes the ideals of a heteronormative
family while defining the eligibility for availing surrogacy. A heterosexual
couple [Section 2 (g) read with Section 4 (iii) (c)], who are married for at
least five years and have no child of their own [Section 4 (iii) (c)] and have
been medically certified to be an infertile couple [Section 2 (r) read with
Section 4 (ii) (a)] are eligible to commission surrogacy. More importantly, the
surrogate mother needs to be a close relative[3] of the couple, is married with children of her own and
does not donate her own gamete for the purposes of surrogacy [Section 4 (iii)
(b)].
By restricting the eligibility to a heterosexual couple
associated through “marriage” and permitting only a “close relative” to be a
surrogate, the surrogacy bill seeks to regulate what women do with their
bodies, but also reinforces the idea of the heteronormative family. Further, it
also criminalises surrogacy in case of single men, women, and live-in partners
including same-sex couples and transgender persons (section 38). Such a restriction
is not only discriminatory, but is violative of the right to reproductive
autonomy as an aspect of the right to privacy guaranteed under the Indian
constitution (Ghosh and Khaitan 2017). Further, by allowing only a “close
relative” to be a surrogate mother, the state promotes casteist notions by
trying to preserve the “purity” of the family (Gopinathan 2018).
A Legal Paradox
Both surrogacy and transgender bills perpetuate a narrow vision
of the "family" based on hetero-patriarchy and caste purity. This
completely ignores instances of Indians creating and living
in non-normative families. The legal regime in India recognises only
monogamous, heterosexual, conjugal relationships that are legitimised by
marriage. Non-biological kinship networks or Hijra Gharanas, same-sex couples, those in polyamorous
relationships or more fluid friendship networks cannot access a range of
civil rights that flow from marriage (Agarwal et al, 2019: 7).
For instance, even though the Protection of Women against
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) recognises live-in relationships, it does
so only between men and women (Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma 2013: para 37). Further, these relationships
must be as “marriage-like” as possible (D Velusamy v D Patchaiammal 2010: para 33).[4] Thus, where a woman enters into such an arrangement with a
married man, she does not receive any protection under the law. By making
marriage and marriage-like relationships the only institution through which the
basic human need for connection, intimacy, and dependency is realised, the law
leaves out many individuals who intend to establish more fluid living
arrangements, or platonic associations that could nonetheless be characterised
by economic and/or emotional interdependence (Duncan et al 2014: 1–10).
A Silver Lining
There are some encouraging signs of change within the
law. In 2017, the Supreme Court recognised privacy as a fundamental right
where the right to sexual intimacy was recognised as a core component of the
right to privacy (Justice KS Puttaswamy & Anr v Union of India 2017: para 157). Based on this robust
framework of privacy, the Supreme Court, while reading down the draconian
Section 377, also observed that the manner in which individuals choose to
exercise intimacy was beyond the legitimate interests of the state (Navtej Johar v Union
of India, 2018: para 240). Even
prior to this, in 2016, the Himachal Pradesh High Court interpreted the
guru-chela relationship as a “custom” and held that a guru would thus be
entitled to the deceased chela’s property (Sweety [Eunuch] v
General Public 2016). These judgments
have opened up avenues for recognising the diversity of relationships,
intimacies and families many of which may not necessarily be heterosexual,
marital, or biological. Significantly, in 2019, the Madras High Court upheld
marriage between a biological man and a transgender woman under the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1956 (Arunkumar v The Inspector General of Registration 2019). Despite the heteronormative
understanding of “consummation” as peno-vaginal intercourse between a cis-man
and a cis-woman under the law, the fact that the court validated this marriage
displays its willingness to interpret “consummation” beyond its traditional
interpretation.
Towards a Functional
View of the Family
If the law recognises the right to intimacy as a core component
of autonomy and privacy, then arguably, it should maintain neutrality between
various forms of intimate relationships and the diverse domestic, emotional,
and economical arrangements that are a part of it. This argument forces us to
re-examine the role of law regulating close, adult, personal relationships. In
other words, how can the law facilitate autonomy in the ways in which we define
“family” while also ensuring that those most vulnerable within such
arrangements are protected?
Legal alternatives for recognising non-normative families have
been especially prominent in the discourse surrounding unmarried, cohabiting
heterosexual partners as well as LGBT+ relationships (Barker 2012: 59–60).
Civil unions and registered partnership laws have been pursued in other
countries. At the same time, given the prevalence of fluid friendship networks,
siblings staying together and a large number of individuals opting to cohabit
than to marry, laws meant to provide defacto recognition to such relationships
have been enacted. Many such acts operational in Canada, Tasmania and Hawaii
recognised not only conjugal, romantic relationships, but also non-conjugal,
caring relationships characterised by some form of economic and emotional
interdependency.[5]
Recently, a group of lesbian, bisexual and trans women when
consulted for their views on the Uniform Civil Code, wrote a letter to the Law
Commission recommending that those who are not married by law should be able to
nominate people who can act as a “legal representative” on their behalf. These
representatives should not have to be related to the person by blood, adoption,
or marriage and would have the authority to act on behalf of a person in the
choice of nominees, custody of minor children, legal heirs and end-of-life decisions
(Shah et al 2018). This could be enabled by issuing certain rules/guidelines
under laws that would allow people to register their legal representatives
through affidavits or any other standard legal format.
A good precedent of such a practice is already prevalent in the
form of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. By giving individuals the freedom to
decide who can be their nominated representative, the Act provides a great
degree of autonomy to individuals. As per section 14 (3), any person who
is not a minor and is competent to discharge the duties can be a nominated
representative under the Act. This person does not have to be related to the
person by blood or marriage. The nominated representative has the authority to
execute an advance directive made by the person in question. This is an
instrument that allows a person to choose how one wants to be cared for during
a mental illness when they no longer have the capacity to make their own
decisions (section 5). Other legislations could also follow a similar
model.
A vision of the family, which is broad and
inclusive and is based on recognising functional aspects of families rather
than their form, that is, what families do rather than what families look like
(Mirabelli 2018), would serve as a useful template when lawmakers are drafting
legislations that regulate intimacy and dependency. Recognising that families
are diverse, complex, and dynamic means providing individuals with the freedom
to nominate/designate their beneficiaries wherever possible and not assuming
ties of blood and conjugality as the only relevant ones. In addition, it would
also involve closely evaluating factors of economic and emotional
interdependence and interpreting them flexibly depending on the legislative
objective and situation (Cossman and Ryder 2001). For instance, in some
situations, co-habitation and duration of the relationship could be a relevant
factor, but in other cases, it may not matter. Hence, maintaining flexibility
as opposed to pursuing a one-size fit all policy is essential and could in the
future, legitimise families of choice.
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